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This paper analyzes the switch from Separate Accounting to Formula Apportionment in a 
dynamic framework. The model features both purely domestic corporations and a domestic 
multinational which invests at home and abroad as well as a purely foreign corporation and a 
foreign multinational which invests in the foreign economy as well as in the domestic 
country. Using such a framework we can show that since the new FA rules apply only to 
multinational firms, this will affect the domestic activity of purely domestic or foreign 
corporations since these stick to SA and thus the marginal product of labour and capital will 
be different for the two firm types. This in turn will affect the investment incentives and 
distort capital and labour allocation between the different types of enterprises operating in an 
economy. 
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September 2007 1 Introduction
For almost 50 years now, European policymakers have debated on the stance of corpo-
rate taxation in Europe especially on the issue whether to harmonize or not corporate
tax systems in the European Union. Most proposals in this direction which focussed on
the coordination of tax rates were however rather unsuccesfull due to the reluctance of
Member Countries to give up their sovereignty of setting these kind of tax rates. Never-
theless, a speciﬁc proposal has found more supporters. It is the proposal of introducing a
common consolidated tax base accompanied by a so-called formula apportionment (Euro-
pean Commission 2001). This idea was ﬁrst advanced in 2001 in the Commission’s report
"Company Taxation in the Internal Market" and has been the working focus of a 2004
established Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group. According to
this proposal, the corporate income of a multinational corporation (MNC) is consolidated
and allocated to the diﬀerent jurisdictions according to a speciﬁcf o r m u l a .T h i sf o r m u l a
measures the relative activity of the MNC in the diﬀerent regions by using diﬀerent mea-
sures such as relative sales, payroll or the relative capital stock employed in that country.
Since the individual country still has the power to set the corporate tax rate and thus does
not have to give up so much sovereignity, this proposal seems to be a preferred alternative
compared to the idea of harmonizing tax rates.
The idea behind all these proposals was the creation of a level playing ﬁeld for the
taxation of MNCs in Europe. In the light of increased tax competition national govern-
ments ﬁnd it increasingly diﬃcult to tax the income of these corporations since these have
the possibility to shift proﬁts to low-tax countries. These proﬁt shifting activities are in-
curred via the use of transfer pricing, thin capitalization rules, or loss shifting activities.
Taxation based on Separate Accounting (SA) is particularly prone to these type of activ-
ities and empirical evidence shows that indeed MNCs try to shift proﬁts from high-tax to
low-tax countries via these channels (see Hines 1999, Büttner and Ruf 2007). Under
the presently applied system of SA, the proﬁts of a MNC are assigned to the state where
they are earned. Then, the individual country levies its national tax rate on the proﬁts
of MNCs located in its jurisdictions. Thus, it is no wonder that MNCs would try to use
1diﬀerent techniques to increase their tax base in low-tax jurisdictions. Moreover, under
SA governments have an incentive to reduce their tax rates to become attractive as an
investment location. Therefore, countries engage in a so-called race to the bottom and do
n o tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h ee ﬀects which their own low national tax rate triggers on other
countries. (Mintz, 1999)
Whereas SA is the usual taxation method in most European countries, a diﬀeent tax
system namely Formula Apportionment (FA) applies in the US and Canada. 1
The literature on FA vs. SA actually started 1980 with McLure’s (1980) famous
contribution. He was the ﬁr s tt os h o wt h a tF Ab a s i c a l l yt r a n s f o r m st h ec o r p o r a t ei n c o m e
tax into three diﬀerent taxes on the factors payroll, sales and capital stock used in the
formula. Thus, by modifying the weights used for these activity measures in the formula,
governments can stimulate investment and employment within their own jurisdictions (see
also Goolsbee and Maydew 2000). Further papers which deal with the aspects of FA
and tax competition are Gordon and Wilson (1986), Anand and Sansing (2000),
Gérard and Weiner (2003), Eggert and Schjelderup (2003,2005), Nielsen et.
al (2004) and Sørensen (2004) to name just a few. While Gordon and Wilson (1986)
show that in equilibrium nations will choose to apply ineﬃciently low tax rates, Nielsen
et al (2004) and Sørensen (2004) ﬁnd mixed eﬀects on welfare if countries choose
to witch from SA to FA. Further studies on the eﬀects of FA include Weiner (1999),
Mintz (1999), Mintz and Smart (2004), Nielsen et al. (2003). Apart from the
above mentioned theoretical papers there exist also a number of empirical studies which
deal wih the eﬀects of introducing FA, of which one should mention for instance Fuest
et. al (2006) which consider the implications of implementing a common consolidated
tax base and FA on the size of the EU wide tax base and on its distribution between EU
member countries.
This paper diﬀers from the above mentioned studies in that it is on the hand the
ﬁr s tt oa n a l y z et h ee ﬀects from the transition from SA to FA in a dynamic setting. On
the other hand we also consider the eﬀects of this transition in a setting in which not
1A similar system is also applied in Switzerland and in Germany at local level for the so-called local
trade tax ("Gewerbesteuer").
2only MNCs but also only purely domestic corporations (and purely foreign corporations)
operate, an aspect which has also not been treated in the literature thus far. Since the
two types of ﬁrms coexist but only MNCs have access to FA, the two diﬀerent taxation
systems will have diﬀerent eﬀects on the marginal product of capital and labour for the
two ﬁrm types. Accordingly, under diﬀerent assumptions, one system or the other may
beneﬁt certain types of ﬁrms such that for instance investments by MNCs will under
certain circumstances crowd out investments and employment by purely domestic ﬁrms.
One paper that also analyzes the eﬀects of the co-existence of these two distinct taxation
systems, looking however only at the eﬀects on MNCs is by Riedel and Runkel (2007).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of two MNCs which
operate both in the domestic and in the foreign economy and two purely domestic corpora-
tions, all subject to a system of taxation under SA. In Section 3 we show how introducing
FA aﬀects the investment decision and labour demand of the two diﬀerent ﬁrm types and
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Purely Domestic and Foreign Corporations
The model follows Keuschnigg (2003) and Keuschnigg (2005).
Domestic and foreign production is carried out on the one hand by purely domestic
and purely foreign corporate ﬁrms, which both rely on a basic neoclassical, linearly ho-
mogenous production technology with positive but diminishing marginal rates of return.
The price of the uniform, tradeable output good, Y , is normalized to one and the fac-
tors capital, K, labour, L serve as inputs. The superscript f ∈ {H,F} distinguishes the


















Capital expands over time whenever gross investment, I, exceeds the depreciation of





t +( 1− δ)K
f
t . (2.2)
The variable G w h i c he n t e r se a c hd i ﬀerential equation in the model denotes the exogenous
t r e n dg r o w t hi nl a b o rp r o d u c t i v i t y ,G =1+g. Accordingly, in the balanced growth
equilibrium all variables grow at the rate g.
Investment additionally incurs adjustment costs of Jf for each unit of capital installed.
The adjustment costs reﬂect positive but diminishing marginal returns to capital forma-
tion and can be interpreted as the costs which arise due to a ﬁrm’s internal reorganization.
The adjustment cost function is linearly homogenous in investment and capital and convex
in investments:
Jf = J(If,Kf)=If · J
f
I + Kf · J
f
K,
with JI > 0; JII > 0; JII < 0.
(2.3)
The steady state adjustment costs are zero and do not inﬂuence the steady state solution.
We follow the "New View" of dividend taxation. Accordingly, distributed dividends
Df are determined residually as the diﬀerence between net-of-tax proﬁts and investment
outlays. Proﬁts are given by output Y f less adjustment costs and wage payments wfLf.
τf d e n o t e st h ec o r p o r a t et a xi nt h er e s p e c t i v ec o u n t r ya n def stands for a tax allowance


















The required return before taxes rV,f has to clear the market for domestic/foreign
equity.
The representative agent is indiﬀerent between investing his or her money in the capital
market or in real assets, since the net of tax return on both investment alternatives has






















Accordingly, in equilibrium, the net return on ﬁrm equity has to equal the net of tax
dividend payment and the net of tax capital gains which can be derived from holding ﬁrm
shares.
Rearranging the no arbitrage condition given in (2.5), the diﬀerential equation deter-




















Solving forward equation (2.6) the ﬁrm value of purely domestic or purely foreign


















t /(1 − tG,f)
, (2.7)




t ,t ot h eﬁrm owners.
Firms’ goal is to maximize their value by choosing optimal labor demand and optimal
investments from period t onwards. Thereby, the ﬁrm value increases with the amount
of capital accumulated from the past. Applying a value function of the form V (K
f
t ) and












































t ,i sd e ﬁned as the marginal change in
the ﬁrm value, if one additional marginal unit of capital is accumulated. The solution to
the intertemporal maximization problem of the ﬁrm is given by the following optimality
5conditions for the control variables labour and investment
L
f : w























The optimal demand for labour is determined by the equality of the marginal product
of labor, F
f
Li and the corresponding labor cost wf.
The second optimality condition deﬁnes the ﬁrm’s optimal investment policy: It re-








, is identical with the incurred marginal cost for carrying out this
investment. The incurred cost of the marginal investment includes the tax adjusted cost




























The shadow price of capital as given by the ﬁrm’s envelope condition (2.11) deﬁnes the
value of an induced marginal proﬁt: Adding one more unit of capital creates a marginal
proﬁt stream consisting of two diﬀerent components: ﬁrst, proﬁts increase by the marginal
product of capital; second, due to lower adjustment costs future revenues increase.






1 − tG,f + δ)
1 − efτf
1 − τf . (2.12)
Without taxes, the investment must oﬀer a rate of return at least equal to depreciation
costs and interest so F
f
K = rV,f + δ. The propensity to invest also depends on the tax
2In a world without taxation - implying zero tax rates- the optimality condition (2.9) simpliﬁes to
[1 + J
f
I ] in the phase of transition and to 1 in the steady state, when adjustment costs are zero. Hence,
the model arrives at the same standard investment criterion, implying that the shadow price of capital
has to equal one, as known from standard investment theory.
6allowance for investments, ef. This term encompasses both depreciation for tax purposes
and direct investment premia, and reduces the actual tax burden if ef > 0.
Diﬀerentiating (2.12) with respect to the tax rate under consideration, we ﬁnd that
reducing the corporate income tax as well as the capital gains rate has a positive impact















(1 − τG,f)2(1 − τf)
> 0. (2.13)
The economic implication of an increase in the corporate tax rate is obvious. If the
corporate tax rate increases, returns stemming from real investments are more heavily
taxed compared to those from a ﬁnancial investment which is not subject to the corporate
tax rate. Hence, the cost of capital increases resulting in less real investments. Concerning
an increase in the capital gains tax the cost of capital increases to the extent that proﬁt
retentions are used as a marginal source of ﬁnance. As a consequence, the investment
activity will slow down. Since we assumed the "New View" of dividend taxation to hold,
the dividend tax will not inﬂuence the cost of capital and thus the investment decision.
2.2 Home Based Multinationals and Foreign Based Multina-
tionals
In this Section we now turn to the production and investment decision of home based and
foreign based multinationals under SA.
Both home and foreign based multinationals also rely on a basic neoclassical, linearly
homogenous production technology with positive but diminishing returns to scale. How-
ever, besides capital and labour we consider an additional input, namely location speciﬁc
rents (ﬁxed factors EHH, EHF and EF, EFH for home and foreign based MNCs respec-
tively), which ensure that production takes place both domestically and abroad and we
do not have a corner solution. Furthermore, in both cases the parent supplies an input
7QH(QF) to the foreign subsidiary which is used in the subsidiary’s production process.
This modelling approach helps us depict the possibility of using transfer pricing to shift













































Y HH and Y HF denote the production of the home based multinational at home and
abroad whereas Y FF and Y FH stand for the output of the foreign based multinational in
the foreign and in the domestic economy respectively.
The cost of equity rm is ﬁxed on international capital markets since the marginal in-
vestor is not subject to domestic/foreign personal taxes on dividends and capital gains, tDf
and tGf. These taxes will determine only portfolio investments but not direct investments
by multinationals.
Taxation of FDI follows the exemption method. Accordingly, the total eﬀective tax
rate for home based multinationals abroad is τHF,t h ee ﬀective tax wedge 1 − τHF and
the domestic tax revenue is 0 per € foreign proﬁt. For foreign based multinationals the
eﬀective tax burden on their activities in the domestic economy will be τH and the foreign
tax revenue per € domestic proﬁt will also be 0 under SA.
As mentioned above we allow for the possibility of proﬁt shifting by MNCs between
headquarters and aﬃliate by the use of transfer pricing for intra-company transactions3.
The true transfer price pQH(pQF) is normalized to unity. If the company underestimates
the transfer price it will shift pQH −1/pQF −1 proﬁts from the headquarter to the aﬃliate
and vice versa in case the transfer price is overestimated. However, these transfer pricing








) which can be
interpreted as the risk of being detected or the eﬀort linked to hiding the true cost of
transfer pricing (Riedel and Runkel 2007, Keuschnigg 2005).
The shareholders receive dividends distributed both by the parent DHH (DFF) and
3The terms in brackets stand for the foreign based MNC.
8by the subsidiary DHF(DFH) in the case of domestic(foreign) based MNCs respectively.
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Here τH and τHF denote the corporate taxes of the domestic and foreign economy
respectively. Therefore, since we apply the source principal and SA the domestic proﬁts of
the home based MNC and of the foreign based MNC are subject to the same domestic tax
rate such that τH = τFH. Similarly, the foreign corporate tax applies to the foreign proﬁts
of home based and foreign based MNCs (τF = τHF). P r o ﬁts of the headquarters are
determined as output produced in the respective country Y HH(Y FF) less adjustment costs
JHH(JFH),w a g ep a y m e n t swLHH(wFLFF) and the income received from the subsidiary
for the supplied input less the agency costs of transfer pricing. Similarly, proﬁts of the
subsidiary are determined as output produced and sold abroad Y HF(Y FH) less adjustment
costs JHF(JFH), wage payments to the labour force LHF(LHF) employed abroad at the
wage rate wF(w) prevailing in the respective economy and less the payment to the parent
for the supplied input pQHQH(pQFQF).
Given that we model the case of small open economies, the ﬁr m st a k et h ew o r l dm a r k e t












t +( 1− δ)KH
t ,G K HF
t+1 = IHF
t +( 1− δ)KHF
t
(2.18)
and of the foreign based MNC by
4We again allow for the possibility to deduct part of new investments from the tax base. This is
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price of capital employed in the economy where the aﬃliate operates, we can derive
the following optimality conditions for the control variables domestic and foreign labour,
investments undertaken at home and abroad as well as for the intra-company supplied
input QH(QF) and its price pQH (pQF)
The optimality conditions for the home based MNC state
(a) LHH : dY HH/dLHH = w,
(b) LHF : dY HF/dLH = wF,































⇒ c0 = τHF−τH
(1−τH) .
(2.20)
Optimality conditions for foreign based MNCs
(a) LFF : dY FF/dLFF = wF,
(b) LFH : dY FH/dLFH = w,
































The ﬁrst two conditions in both sets of the above equations determine the level of
10optimal labour demand at home and abroad. In each country ﬁrms will employ labour
up to the point where the marginal product of labour in the domestic and foreign econ-
omy equals the respective wage rate. Equations (2.20c and d) and (2.21c and d) show
the MNCs’ optimal investment policy: These conditions require that the present value of









t+1) respectively, is identi-
cal with the incurred marginal cost for carrying out this investment. The incurred cost of
the marginal investment includes the adjustment costs and the tax adjusted cost of the
investment, 1 − eτH and 1 − eFτHF in case of the home based MNC and 1 − eFτF and
1−eτFH in case of the foreign based MNC. Thus one can see that the investment decision
crucially depends on the source corporate tax rate prevailing in the two economies while
the labour demand is aﬀected by the respective wage rate. The 5th optimality condtion
shows the optimal amount of input supplied to the subsidiary. The home (foreign) based
MNC will supply inputs to its aﬃliate as long as the net of tax received payment less
concealment costs is larger or equal to the net of tax payment the subsidiary has to pay to
the parent. Finally, the last equation shows the optimal transfer price which is determined
under SA by the equality between the marginal concealment cost and the marginal gain
from proﬁt shifting given by the relative diﬀerence between the domestic and the foreign
corporate tax rate.
Finally the envelope conditions for the stock variables KH, KHF,KFF and KFH deﬁne
the value of an induced marginal proﬁt. The proﬁt stream created by one more unit of





































































11Once again by combining eq.(2.20c), (2.20d), and the envelope conditions for home







K − δ =
1 − τF
1 − eFτF Y
HF
K − δ. (2.24)




1 − eFτF Y
FF




K − δ. (2.25)
Thus, given that the cost of equity is ﬁx e do nt h ew o r l dm a r k e ta n dg i v e nt h es o u r c e
taxes on corporate proﬁts prevailing in the domestic and in the foreign economy, the
marginal product of capital in the two economies has to adjust accordingly to make an
investment at home or abroad attractive. If the two countries allow both for instance for
immediate write-oﬀ of new investments, such that e = eF =1 , than the standard result
which equates the marginal product of capital to the given interest rate is derived. If
on the contrary both countries allow only for true economic depreciation such that e =
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F)Y
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This condition shows that the investment incentives crucially depend on the proﬁtt a x
rates and that MNCs will invest in the two economies up to the point where the net of
tax marginal products of capital are equalized.
3 Introducing Formula Apportionment (FA)
We now turn to the eﬀects of introducing a new system of taxing the proﬁts of MNCs.
Under this approach the proﬁts of both the headquarter and the aﬃliated company are
5Given that we assume the SS adjustment costs are zero, i.e. J = JI = JK =0
12consolidated and then apportioned to the respective countries according to a speciﬁc
formula. We assume the formula contains capital and payroll as factors, while the share
of each factor in the formula is denoted by shK and shL for the domestic economy and
sfK and sfL for the foreign economy. To avoid loss of generality we assume each country
has the power to choose apart from the tax rate also the shares of capital and labour in
the formula. Due to the consolidated tax base, MNCs do not have any incentives to shift
proﬁts by means of transfer pricing. Thus, in the below formulae which show the tax
burden of home and foreign based MNCs at home and abroad, the transfer pricing terms



























































































Accordingly, under the new taxation system,6 distributed dividends will equal proﬁts
6We assume for simplicity e = eF =0
13less adjustment costs, wage payments and net investments and the tax liability due in the
respective country, so TH and THF for the proﬁts of the home based MNC at home and
abroad and TF and TFH for the proﬁts of the foreign based MNC in the foreign and in
the domestic economy.
DHH = Y HH − JHH − wLHH − IHH − TH,
DHF = Y HF − JHF − wFLHF − IHF − THF.
(3.29)
DFF = Y FF − JFF − wFLFF − IF − TF,
DFH = Y FH − JFH − wLFH − IFH − TFH.
(3.30)
As before, DHH and DHF are the dividends distributed by home based MNC and DFF
and DFH denote the dividends of the foreign based MNC. Inserting these new expressions
in eq.(2.18) and (2.19) we can derive the following new optimality conditions for labour
and capital which apply under FA.
(
dY HH
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dLFH = w +
1




H · shL − τ
F · sfL)
Equations (3.31) and (3.33) show the optimality conditions for labour employed by
t h eh o m eb a s e dM N Ca th o m ea n da b r o a d .I ti ss t r i k i n gt h a tn o to n l yt h ed o m e s t i ca n d
foreign wage rates but also the proﬁt taxes and the weighting share of labour in the above
formulae as well as the diﬀerences τH ·shL−τF ·sfL and τF ·sfL−τH ·shL aﬀect the
decision of how much labour to employ domestically and abroad. Assuming for instance
an equal weight for payroll in the two formulae such that shL = sfL,i ft h ef o r e i g nw a g e
rate wF is lower than the domestic wage rate w and the domestic corporate tax is larger
than the foreign one such that τF −τH < 0, then the marginal product of labour employed
in the foreign economy will be lower than in the domestic economy. However, even when
the foreign wage rate is lower, if the foreign corporate tax is high enough compared to the
domestic one, this eﬀect might mitigate the eﬀect of the lower foreign wage such that in
the end the marginal product of labour abroad will be larger. More generally, it will be
the diﬀerence between the foreign source tax multiplied with the share of payroll in the
apportionment formula and the domestic proﬁt tax multiplied with the domestic share
of labour i.e. τF · sfL − τH · shL which will inﬂuence the diﬀerent marginal products of
labour in the two countries.
Looking now at the employment decision of MNCs vs. domestic corporations, one can
see that given a unique domestic wage rate which both types of ﬁr m sh a v et pp a yt ot h e i r
employees, the marginal product of labour will diﬀer between domestic corporations and
15home based MNCs (see eq. (2.20a), (2.21b) and (3.31), (3.34)). As long as the diﬀerence
between the domestic and foreign proﬁtt a xi sp o s i t i v e 7 τH−τF > 0, the marginal product
of labour under FA so accordingly the marginal product of labour which applies to MNCs
will be higher than that one applying to domestic corporations (since these ones still
stick to SA). Given a higher domestic corporate tax compared to the foreign one, the
marginal product of labour of home and foreign based MNCs which invest domestically
has to rise compared to the marginal product of labour of domestic corporations.8 A
similar argument applies to foreign corporations and foreign and home based MNCs for
their activities in the foreign economy.
Turning now to the investment decisions of home and foreign based MNCs, introducing
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K =0we can derive from the above
equations the marginal product of capital for home based MNCs which invest domestically
and abroad as
7Assuming once again equal shares for the payroll factor in the formulae of both countries so shL = sfL
8This diﬀerence in the two diﬀerent productivities can also be explained/achieved by the third factor
which enters the production function of MNCs, namels the country speciﬁc ﬁxed factor EH.
9We assume for simplicity no special investment allowances apply such that e=0. The optimality and























H · shK − τ
F · sfK)]
Comparing eq. (??) with the marginal product of capital for purely domestic corpo-
rations Y H
K =( rm + δ) 1
1−τH
10w h i c hc a nb ed e r i v e df r o me q . ( 2 . 1 2 ) ,w ec a ns e et h a tt h e
incentives for investing in domestic corporations vis-à-vis home-based MNCs will diﬀer
since each of the two ﬁrm types will be subject to a diﬀerent taxation system. For in-
stance, if τH ·shK −τF ·sfK < 0 and 1−τHB1−τFB2 > 1−τH, the marginal product
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Fig. 1 Misallocation of capital within an economy under FA and SA
10Assuming rm = rV
1−tG
17As Figure 1 shows, the optimal capital allocation within an economy K* would be
at the point where the marginal product of capital of home based MNCs and domestic
corporations intersect. Here, domestic output is maximized and amounts to ABK*OMNC
plus BCODCK∗. However, if both taxation systems apply at the same time and under
the assumptions mentioned above, too much capital will be emplyed in the sector of
MNCs and too little in domestic corporations such that we will have an overall output
loss amounting to BDE.
Under a diﬀerent tax costellation the opposite picture might occur such that there is
too much capital employed by domestic corporations compared to MNCs. Nevertheless,
the message is clear. Applying two diﬀe r e n tt a x a t i o ns y s t e m sa tt h es a m et i m ew i l ld i s t o r t
the allocation of capital within an economy resulting in a output loss.11
However, if we also consider the incentives of foreign based MNCs to invest domesti-
cally, if the domestic corporate tax multiplied with the share of capital in the domestic
formula is lower than the foreign corporate tax multiplied with the share of capital in the
foreign formula i.e. τH · shK − τF · sfK < 0 , and if in addition τFD1+τHD2 >τ H,a
situation might arise in which the marginal product of capital under FA for foreign based
MNCs is higher than the one for domestic corporations. (see eq.(??))
Regarding the investment incentives of foreign based MNCs, introducing FA now im-























F · sfK − τ
H · shK)]
Once again comparing eq. (??a), (??b) and Y F
K =( rm + δ) 1
1−τF which represent the
investment incentives applying to purely foreign corporations, we can see that, in general,
11The investment incentives under SA and FA will equalize only in case τH · shK − τF · sfK =0and
τHB1 − τFB2=τH .
18the two diﬀe r e n tt a x a t i o ns y s t e m sw i l ld r i v eaw e d g eb e t w e e nt h em a r g i n a lp r o d u c to f
capital for the two ﬁrm types operating abroad, resulting in a misallocation of capital in
the foreign economy as well.
The analysis of this system change within a dynamic framework is completed with the
study of the transition path from the initial to the ﬁnal steady state.
The dynamics of the transition under perfect foresight from the initial SS under SA
to the ﬁnal SS under FA depends on the particular tax constellation. Since we have a
‘two point boundary value problem’, the system starts at a predetermined capital stock
given for instance for the domestic economy by KHH
t = KHH
0 . The future equilibrium of
the system is reﬂected by the shadow price of capital ηHH
t . The transition between the
initial and the ﬁnal steady state must satisfy the following diﬀerence equation system for
































Figure 2 depicts how the two variables, capital KHH and its value ηHH behave to satisfy
eq.(??) at every point in time given their initial values. To characterize the transition






































Suppose, for instance, that the starting point is B. Because ηHH is larger than its equilib-
rium value, ﬁrms increase the capital stock. Accordingly ∆KHH > 0. Since proﬁts are low
because KHH is high, ηHH can also be high only in case it is expected to rise such that
19∆ηHH > 0. Consequently, we will move in the diagram up and to the right. The quantity
of capital in the economy is inherited from the past and only the market value of capital
adjusts. Therefore, for a speciﬁc value of KHH we can compute a unique value for ηHH
that determines the saddle path ηHH(KHH). Along this path KHH and ηHH converge to
the unique equilibrium point A. This long-run equilibrium is characterized by ηHH =1 ,
Y HH
K =( rm +δ) 1
1−τH and IHH =( δ +g)KHH(implying ∆KHH =0 )and ∆ηHH =0such
that given the interest rates and tax parameters, ﬁrms have no incentive to decrease or
increase the capital stock (Romer, 2001).
Fig. 2 Investment Dynamics under Perfect Foresight
The transition to FA changes the envelope condition and accordingly also the ∆ηHH
locus (see eq.(??) below). It is not clear however whether more or less capital will be



































H · shK − τ
F · sfK)
If, for instance as assumed above τH · shK − τF · sfK < 0 , then the locus of the
20∆ηHH =0curve is shifted upwards (see Fig. 3). The economy is initially in the long-run
equilibrium at point E1. ηHH jumps to the point on the new saddle path for the given
capital stock (E2). KHH and ηHH then move down along the path to the new equilibrium
point E3. Thus, under these assumptions, the introduction of FA leads to an increase in
the capital stock from KHH to KHH0
Fig. 3 The transition from Formula Apportionment to Separate Accounting
Nevertheless, this transition path is depicted for a speciﬁc tax constellation. Under
diﬀerent assumptions which lead to a higher marginal product of capital under FA than
under SA, capital within the sector of domestic based MNCs might decumulate.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The aim of this paper was twofold. We ﬁrst attempted to analyze the switch from SA to
FA within a dynamic framework. The second main purpose was to shed light on how the
co-existence of two diﬀerent tax systems, each applying to a diﬀerent ﬁrm type, aﬀects the
allocation of capital between MNCs and purely domestic corporations within an economy.
Our ﬁndings show that the introduction of FA leads to a loss in domestic output since
both the marginal product of labour and the investment incentives will diﬀer for the two
21ﬁrm types. Thus the parallel existence of SA and FA creates a distortion in the allocation
of labour and capital. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether MNCs or purely domestic or
purely foreign corporations will beneﬁt from this system change since the results depend
on the particular tax constellations. Diﬀerent scenarios lead either to an accumulation or
a decumulation of capital in the sector of home based MNCs depending on the domestic
and foreign corporate tax, the share of labour and capital in the domestic and foreign
formula and the diﬀerence between the domestic tax rate multiplied with share of the
respective factor in the domestic formula less the foreign tax rate multiplied with share
of the respective factor in the foreign formula.
Appendix - Functional Forms
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